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Law and Ignorance:
Genetic Therapy and the Legal Process
Roger B. Dworkin*
Like most new developments in medicine and biotechnology, human gene ther-
apy holds out the promise of substantial benefits to humanity while threatening
both specific health hazards and fundamental damage to human dignity, and chal-
lenging us to consider the very limits of humanness. This combination of promise,
threat, and challenge is what makes the subject interesting, not only because the
advantages and disadvantages of gene therapy must be weighed and evaluated, but
because the weighing and evaluating must take place in the face of overwhelming
ignorance. That ignorance poses the most difficult kind of puzzle for persons who
must consider what the social response to human gene therapy should be.
In some sense, of course, social policy makers, law makers, always act in the
face of ignorance. No matter how conscientiously lawmakers may have studied a
problem, no one can foresee the full range of consequences that will follow from
legal enactments or decisions. Ignorance, however, is a matter of degree. In most
situations ignorance is a minor factor in the legal equation. Lawmakers usually
know, or at least think they know, a great deal about the area under consideration.
In considering gene therapy, however, ignorance is the essence of the legal dilem-
ma. The question is whether and how to regulate in an area that is ill understood
and whose ramifications can only be imagined. Regulating in the face of over-
whelming ignorance presents the law with a terrible dilemma - balancing the im-
perative of protecting society from unknown, but imaginable evils with the impera-
tive of refraining from adopting law that will be unwise, freeze the growth of
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on Biotechnological Chal-
lenges for Law and Ethics, which was held in Milan and Bellagio, Italy from August 5
through 11, 1995. I am grateful to the organizers of the conference and to the other partici-
pants in it for a very valuable opportunity to exchange views across national and disciplinary
cultures.
I wish to thank Ralph Gaebler, international law librarian at the Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington, for wonderful assistance and for service above and- beyond the call of
duty; my colleague, Professor David Fidler, for helpful and patient explanations of certain
aspects of European legal institutions; Professor Gonzalo Herranz for generous and helpful
explanations of Spanish law; Professors Luis Diez-Picazo and Derek Penslar and Ms. Robin
Penslar and Ralph Gaebler for graciously providing translation services; and Peter Daniel Di-
Paola for very helpful research assistance.
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science and technology, and deprive society of unknown, but imaginable benefits.
How to resolve that dilemma is the subject of this paper.
Gene Therapy
Broadly speaking, gene therapy may be classified either as somatic cell therapy
or as germ-line therapy. Somatic cell therapy involves an effort "to treat an indi-
vidual patient, e.g., by inserting a properly functioning gene into a patient's
somatic [nonreproductive] cells".' Germ-line therapy, on the other hand, involves
an effort "to introduce genetic changes into the germ (reproductive) cells of an in-
dividual, with the aim of changing the set of genes passed on to the individual's
offspring."2
Further classification that takes into account the purpose of the therapies is pos-
sible. Thus, one can subdivide both somatic cell and germ-line therapy into thera-
pies intended to cure or prevent disease and those intended to enhance the charac-
teristics of healthy persons.
3
Despite the fact that successful somatic cell therapy will increase the number of
homozygotes who will pass disease genes to their offspring4 and some public un-
easiness about such therapy,5 a broad consensus exists that somatic cell therapy to
correct serious diseases of identifiable human beings is ethically acceptable. 6 No
such consensus exists about the acceptability of germ-line therapy,7 and most gov-
ernment, professional, and religious groups that have taken a position on germ-line
therapy oppose its use.8 The few groups that have taken a position on the use of
gene therapy for enhancement, rather than to cure or prevent disease, oppose that
use of genetic technology.9 Indeed, concern that germ-line therapy will be used to
I Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines), 59
Fed. Reg. 34496, 34529 (1994).
2 Id.
3 Nelson A. Wivel/LeRoy Walters, "Germ-Line Modification and Disease Prevention
Some Medical and Ethical Perspectives", 262 Science 533 (1993).
4 Burke K. Zimmerman, "Human Germ-Line Therapy: The Case for its Development and
Use", 16 J. Med. & Phil. 593, 594 (1991).
5 W French Anderson, "Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?", 14 J. Med. & Phil.
681 (1989).
6 Testimony of Dr LeRoy Walters, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, Hearing, "Gene Therapy: Status, Prospects for the Future, and Gov-
ernment Policy Implications", 93, 94 (Sept. 28, 1994).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.; see Alex Mauron/Jean-Marie Thvoz "Germ-Line Engineering: A Few European
Voices", 16 J. Med. & Phil. 649, 651 (1991), noting that a large consensus exists against the
use of germ-line engineering to "improve" human beings.
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pursue genetic enhancement is one reason that some critics oppose germ-line ther-
apy.
Several different arguments are made against germ-line therapy. Eric Juengst
has suggested that five basic arguments exist: (1) arguments based on scientific un-
certainty and clinical risks; (2) "slippery slope" arguments based on the fear that
germ-line therapy to fight disease will inevitably lead to its use for enhancement;
(3) arguments based on the impossibility of obtaining the consent of future genera-
tions; (4) arguments based on the view that resources devoted to developing germ-
line therapy could be better spent elsewhere; and (5) arguments based on the im-
portance of maintaining the genetic patrimony.
10
The resource allocation argument is neither very interesting, nor very important.
One can always argue about whether it would be "better" to devote resources to
feeding the hungry, preventive medicine, or research that is likely to help a large
number of people than to developing an entirely new, problematic approach to con-
fronting disease. Nothing about germ-line therapy makes that argument any differ-
ent here than it would be in the case of somatic cell therapy or therapies that do not
involve genetic technologies.
Similarly, arguments based on scientific uncertainty and clinical risk usually at-
tend efforts to develop new approaches to fighting disease. Well established ethical
codes and legal procedures exist to govem the development of new drugs and med-
ical devices. Elaborate procedures for the protection of human subjects are in
place. To the extent that developing germ-line therapy involves experimentation
with identifiable human subjects and efforts to develop new "drugs", existing pro-
cedures are no less adequate than they are in the context of developing other kinds
of new therapeutic agents. 1
Nonetheless, even the resource allocation and scientific uncertainty-clinical risk
arguments are rooted in uncertainty. We do not know what the payoff for germ-line
research will be or how its benefits will compare with those that could be achieved
through different resource allocations. And, by definition, arguments about scien-
tific uncertainty are arguments about what to do when we do not know what the
outcome of different courses of action will be.
10 Eric T Juengst, "Germ-Line Gene Therapy: Back to Basics", 16 J. Med. & Phil. 587,
590 (1991). See also Donald S. Rubenstein/David C. Thomasma/Eric A. Schon/Michael J.
Zinaman, "Germ-Line Therapy to Cure Mitochondrial Disease: Protocol and Ethics of In Vi-
tro Ovum Nuclear Transplantation", 4 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 316, 332-
334 (1995); Zimmerman, supra fn. 4, at 605-09.
11 In the United States the Food and Drug Administration regulates all efforts to introduce
new drugs, including those that involve gene therapy, "Application of Current Statutory
Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy Products and Gene Therapy Products", 58 Fed.
Reg. 53248 (1993). See Testimony of Dr Nelson Wivel, U.S. House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology, Hearing, "Gene Therapy: Status, Prospects for
the Future, and Government Policy Implications", 20, 22-23 (Sept. 28, 1994).
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The other arguments against germ-line therapy require more attention. One ma-
jor concern is that the use of germ-line therapy to cure disease will lead inevitably
to its use for enhancement, that is, that germ-line therapy will become a tool of
positive eugenics.' 2 This argument assumes (1) that enhancement, or at least en-
hancement that is not a form of preventive medicine,' 3 is so inappropriate that it
ought not to be permitted regardless of what legitimate benefits are lost through
the prohibition, and (2) that persons and society will be unable or unwilling to
draw a line between medical and enhancement uses of germ-line therapy. Since the
line cannot be drawn, all uses of germ-line therapy must be prohibited.
Neither of these assumptions is susceptible to proof. Perhaps what seems an en-
hancement today will turn out to be a disadvantage; perhaps humans lack the wis-
dom to make wise choices about which traits to promote and at what rate; perhaps
any change in the natural order of trait distribution will constitute an evil. But per-
haps the opposite will turn out to be true. As Burke Zimmerman has argued,
"There are no inherent objections to carrying out genetic 'enhancement' in indi-
vidual cases.. We must simply be especially careful in evaluating the criteria
for deciding which enhancements are appropriate. 14 Will enhancement lead to the
dehumanization of future generations as people come to see themselves as arti-
facts? Will enhancement lead to injustice in the distribution of opportunities for
enhancement and the benefits that will flow from it? Or is Resnik correct in sug-
gesting that these harms are either unrealistic or avoidable? 15 One can have an
opinion, but one cannot know.
Similarly, the argument that it will be impossible to draw lines is an assertion
that may or may not turn out to be correct. Somatic cell therapy is sometimes used
for enhancement, as, for example, when genetically engineered human growth hor-
mone is administered to short children who have no pathology in an effort to make
them taller. Does that use of enhancement therapy prove that we cannot draw lines
so that somatic cell therapy should not have been allowed? Or does the standard
argument that treats somatic cell therapy and germ-line therapy as significantly dif-
ferent demonstrate that lines can be drawn? Berger and Gert argue that it is possi-
ble to define a "malady" and to limit germ-line therapy to the correction of mala-
dies. 16 Yet their distrust of human beings makes them unwilling to rely on. people
doing that and leads them to counsel against the use of germ-line therapy lest a
12 Edward M. Berger/Bernard M. Gert, "Genetic Disorders and the Ethical Status of
Germ-Line Gene Therapy", 16 J. Med. & Phil. 667, 679-80 (1991); David Resnik, "Debunk-
ing the Slippery Slope against Human Germ-Line Gene Therapy", 19 J. Med. & Phil. 23
(1994).
13 See, W. French Anderson, "Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considera-
tions", 10 J. Med. & Phil. 275 (1985).
14 Zimmerman, supra fn. 4, at 610.
15 Resnik, supra fn. 12.
16 Berger/Gert, supra fn. 12, at 671.
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few people benefit at the expense of many.17 Which view is correct, the one based
on the logical possibility of defining maladies, or the one based on a negative view
of human nature? Nobody knows.
Thus, both halves of the slippery slope argument are based on unproved assump-
tions. The lawmaker who acts out of concern for the dangers of the slippery slope
will be acting on the basis of unfounded predictions, not on the basis of informa-
tion.
A lack of information also bedevils the claim that we should not engage in
germ-line therapy because we cannot obtain the consent of the next generation. By
definition, successful germ-line therapy will affect persons yet unborn. They are
unable to decide whether to consent to the risks of germ-line therapy or its pro-
posed benefits. Therefore, the argument goes, we should refrain from using germ-
line therapy.
On one level this argument is strikingly unpersuasive. Children cannot consent
to any kind of therapy; their parents or guardians consent for them. Almost every-
thing that a pregnant woman does may have an impact on her unborn child. That
fact does not disable the woman from existing, and most maternal behavior is tol-
erated even if some other course of conduct would clearly be better for the fetus.
1 8
Even some experiments are allowed to be conducted on children. 19 Thus, in other
medical contexts the inability of a patient or subject to consent does not require us
to refrain from action. Why should it do so here?
Part of the problem of the inability of future generations to consent is based on
factual ignorance. We do not know whether an unborn or unconceived person
would consent to a particular procedure. But often in medicine we do not know
what an incompetent person would consent to. In all other situations we solve this
problem by assigning a surrogate decision-maker and adopting a substantive stan-
dard, typically either substituted judgment or the best interests of the patient, for
the decision-maker to apply.20 Thus, ignorance about incompetent persons' prefer-
ences does not block action elsewhere, and, by itself, it seems insufficient to block
it here.
17 Id, at 680.
18 See generally Roger B. Dworkin, "Common Sense and Common Decency: Some
Thoughts about Maternal-Fetal Conflict", 1991 Biomedical Ethics Reviews 9 (J. Humber/R.
Almeder, eds.).
19 Department of Health and Human Services, Policy for the Protection of Human Re-
search Subjects, Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.401 et. seq. (1984).
20 This approach has been developed most fully in litigation about the so-called right to
die. See generally, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841
(1990); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewic, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. den. sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
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Nonetheless, riding roughshod over persons who cannot consent is very worri-
some, and the inability of a person to consent to a procedure that affects him or her
should certainly give us pause. The problem here, however, is that we do not know
whether there is any "person" or other entity deserving of moral consideration in-
volved. Some forms of germ-line therapy involve manipulation of embryos, beings
whose moral status is unclear and controversial. Other forms, however, would in-
volve alterations to the cells of living persons with the purpose of affecting those
persons' future, as yet unconceived offspring. What does it mean to talk about the
consent or non-consent of an unconceived person, especially if the consequence of
refusing to do germ-line therapy is that the person will never be born? The uncon-
ceived are not thought to have a right to consent to other decisions affecting their
genetic makeup - whether their father or mother marries a blond or a brunette, an
athlete or a scholar, a carrier of the gene for Huntington's disease or a non-carrier.
What is the case for recognizing an entitlement to consent in the one instance of
germ-line therapy, an instance in which the entire point of the intervention is to
permit the unconceived person to be born and to be healthy?
Perhaps the point is one that transcends the individual. Perhaps there is an obli-
gation to maintain the genetic patrimony. Mauron and Thtvoz describe the idea
that there is a basic human right to one's unmodified genetic endowment, or "ge-
netic patrimony". This right is a collective one; there is a "collective genetic heri-
tage" that is worth more than any individual interest. "[O]ne cannot touch the 'ge-
netic patrimony' even if some persons would benefit."
2 1
Why not? The "genetic patrimony" of all species has changed naturally over
time. Only a mystic commitment to the natural would suggest that humanly caused
alterations are somehow less acceptable than natural ones. Surely, the notion that
natural is best is out of keeping with all developments in modem medicine and
cannot be taken seriously. 22 The argument, then, must be that in the area of germ-
line therapy our unnatural interventions will take us down a path we cannot know,
and that an unknown path is one we should not tread. This is, of course, the argu-
ment based on ignorance once again. Ignorance plus pessimism leads to the con-
clusion that germ-line gene therapy should not proceed.
The arguments in favor of germ-line therapy are hardly more convincing. Here
too Eric Juengst suggests that there are five basic arguments: (1) medical utility,
21 Mauron/Thfvo supra fn. 9, at 654.
22 Dorothy C. Wertz, "Leave the Door Open to Research", 13 Politics & the Life Sciences
235 (1994). "It is not clear why hazards of nature should necessarily be better than achieve-
ments of science.... This view overlooks the importance of artificial components in our lives
and activities. We are artificial beings by our very nature. The human intelligence and conse-
quent capability of innovation and creativity also belong to nature." Group of Advisors on
Ethical Implications of Biotechnology of the European Commission, Report on Ethical As-
pects of Gene Therapy 13 (1994) (Archer Report), quoted in: Note (Charles F DeJager),
"The Development of Regulatory Standards for Gene Therapy in the European Union", 18
Fordham Internat'l L.J. 1303, 1334 (1995).
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(2) medical necessity, (3) prophylactic efficiency, (4) respect for parental autono-
my, and (5) scientific freedom.23
The first three arguments are all based on predictions about germ-line therapy -
that it will be useful for curing disease, that it may be the only way to cure some
diseases, and that it will prove cheaper and safer in the long run than frequent
use of somatic therapy. Maybe these predictions will turn out to be correct, but we
do not know whether they will. Germ-line therapy is still remote. How useful,
necessary, and efficient it will turn out to be if we allow it to develop remains to be
seen.
The last two arguments, like opponents' arguments about unconsenting future
generations and the genetic patrimony, are simply assertions that one may or may
not accept. Parental reproductive autonomy is hardly unquestioned in the world to-
day. Even one who accepts the idea in the abstract may well think there is a differ-
ence between prohibiting the police from regulating activities in the marital bed-
room and promoting research and therapy that will allow a parent to control the
genetic makeup of his or her child. Indeed, the claim of parental autonomy is the
argument that leads most obviously to the suggestion that germ-line therapy will
be used for enhancement and that, therefore, it should not be permitted.
Similarly, everyone now concedes that scientific freedom has limits. Some re-
search is simply too awful to do, and many restraints are imposed on research with
human subjects and with animals. Whether the research necessary to develop
germ-line therapy is such research is a question. Its answer cannot simply be as-
sumed.
Thus, the arguments for and against germ-line therapy all rest on unprovable
factual suppositions or arguable assertions of values. How ought a lawmaker to re-
spond when confronted with such arguments?
Process Values
The most obvious and tempting response, of course, is simply to choose one set
of arguments to believe and adopt the policy that will promote one's point of view.
A scientific optimist or adherent of parental or scientists' rights will support germ-
line therapy and oppose its legal prohibition; a pessimist or advocate for the auton-
omy rights of the unborn or the communal genetic patrimony will oppose the ther-
apy and seek to have it banned. Indeed, an extreme adherent of this view will op-
pose all technological developments that pose even the slightest risk of cata-
24
strophic consequences.
23 Juengst, supra fn. 10, at 589-90. See also Rubenstein/Thomasma/Schon/Zinaman, su-
pra fn. 10, at 329-332.
24 See, e.g., Mauron/Thivoz, supra ft. 9, at 659, discussing the work of Hans Jonas.
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What these supportive and antagonistic positions about gene therapy have in
common is that they are based exclusively on substantive considerations - the de-
sirability or undesirability of germ-line therapy. What they both forget is that all
law also involves another set of values, the values that underlie the legal system. A
legal system has its own ends to serve and its own institutions for serving them.
Law made without devoting attention to these process values will inevitably be un-
successful from everybody's point of view, including the point of view of those
who appeared to succeed in having the law adopt their position.
25
Careful attention to process and to the characteristics of legal institutions sug-
gests the lack of wisdom in adopting extreme legal positions in the face of uncer-
tainty. Law is a collection of tools of limited utility, which can make only limited
contributions to the resolution of social issues posed by rapidly developing medical
technology.
This is not surprising. All legal institutions are created and operated by human
beings whose scientific knowledge, ability to predict the future, and wisdom about
matters of ultimate moral significance are all extremely limited. Moreover, the in-
stitutions these human beings have created are not designed to choose between ar-
guable positions in which much that is desirable inheres on both sides of the issue.
The law can choose between right and wrong, but in the area of germ-line therapy,
as in most of bioethics, there is right on all sides of the issue. The choice is not
between right and wrong, but rather between ways to sacrifice the least that is
right, or good, in all positions. As Paul Freund noted years ago, "The law is dialec-
tic in a deeper sense than its adversary process. It mediates most significantly be-
tween right and right".
26
If the goal of the law is to mediate between right and right, then it makes little
sense to think that the law should adopt an extreme position about germ-line ther-
apy. Either prohibition or unfettered development will sacrifice all that is "right"
about the other point of view. Thus, legislation or, at least in the United States,
worse yet, constitutional adjudication that prohibits germ-line therapy or estab-
25 The great seminal work in establishing the overriding value of process to law is Henry
M. Hart, Jr lAlbert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, which after circulating in mimeographed
form for decades, is finally available in a hard cover, printed edition. (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994). For an effort to apply legal process analysis to the field
of bioethics in general see, Roger B. Dworkin, Limits: The Role of the Law in Bioethical
Decision Making, (forthcoming), which, among other things, explores at great length the
Pyrrhic victory won by American abortion rights advocates who let their substantive goals
blind them to the dictates of procedural good sense.
Andrea Bonnicksen, who does not specifically mention process or process values, offers
an interesting argument that national approaches to germ-line therapy are preferable to inter-
national ones for reasons that are rooted in considerations of legal process at the national and
international levels. Andrea Bonnicksen, "National and International Approaches to Human
Germ-Line Gene Therapy", 13 Politics & the Life Sciences 39 (1994).
26 Paul Freund, "Legal Frameworks for Human Experimentation," in: Paul Freund, Ex-
perimentation with Human Subjects 105 (1969).
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fishes rights to pursue the therapy as a form of parental autonomy or scientific free-
dom would be a-serious mistake.
In order to mediate between right and right, the law should adopt the least intru-
sive institutional approach that can achieve the balance that is needed to avoid los-
ing too much that is valued by persons on all sides of the issue. In this context what
that suggests is the adoption of administrative regulations that will permit germ-
line therapy to be developed and used subject to relatively easily changed controls
to prevent abuse and reduce the risk of.injury.
Common law case development, which in the common law world is generally
the least intrusive form of law, will not suffice here. One of the primary goals in
regulating germ-line therapy is to control the conduct of researchers and physi-
cians. Common law adjudication, which operates after-the-fact, resolves cases one
at a time, and is highly fact-specific, lacks the clarity, generalizability, certainty,
and predictability to be effective at conduct control.
Conversely, legislation, and especially criminal legislation, which is more effec-
tive than common law at controlling conduct, is both too political and too extreme
to deal well with an area like germ-line therapy. Legislators are unlikely to be
scientifically sophisticated; they make decisions that are partly based on political
(i.e., irrelevant) considerations; their enactments are difficult to adopt and, there-
fore, difficult to change if they turn out to be ill-advised or if they become out-
dated; and the limitations of language and the abstract nature of their pronounce-
ments make it difficult for them either to paint with a fine brush or to achieve the
certainty that legislation seems to offer. Criminal legislation shares all these prob-
lems, but in criminal law they are exacerbated by the extreme, morally ambiguous
venture on which the law has embarked - the intentional infliction of pain by the
state. Only conduct that is almost universally condemned as immoral should be
subjected to criminal penalties, and, even then, subject to numerous prudential
constraints. 27 Obviously, germ-line therapy, which offers potential for great human
benefit, does not qualify.
If legislation is an inappropriate response to germ-line therapy, then constitu-
tional adjudication, the legal system's most extreme response, is even more so.
Constitutional adjudication establishes principled, national, sweeping rules that are
unlikely to be sound in areas that have little to do with the nature and structure of
government, and that are characterized by intense moral conflict, rapidly changing
facts, and scientific information which judges are ill-equipped to understand.
Administrative agencies are the legal institutions best suited to consider the is-
sues presented by germ-line therapy. First, agencies are staffed in part by persons
with expertise in the fields being regulated. Therefore, they are more likely than
inexpert judges or legislators to be able to understand the technical aspects of the
27 See generally, Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968); see also,
Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, "Germ-Line Gene Therapy: Keep The Window Open a
Crack", 13 Politics & the Life Sciences 217, 219 (1994).
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issues before them. Second, agencies are able to adopt regulations, which give
them greater ability to control conduct than common law courts. Third, they also
have the ability to decide specific cases, thereby giving them more ability to draw
subtle factual distinctions than legislature. Fourth, they are staffed in part by civil
servants who are better insulated from politics than legislators. To the extent that
the civil servants are subject to political influence, at least it is political influence
relevant to the broad mandate of their agency. That is, unlike a legislator, an em-
ployee of the Food and Drug Administration cannot be pressured to trade a vote
about germ-line therapy for a vote on the location of a new military base.
Of course, the time for an idealistic, romanticized vision of administrative agen-
cies is long past. Everybody understands that agency proceedings can become bu-
reaucratic nightmares and that industry groups can capture control of the very
agencies that are supposed to be regulating them. The argument here is not that
administrative agencies are ideally suited to deal with germ-line therapy, only that
they are better suited than any other legal institutions. Surely agencies are more
able than other institutions to make incremental, tentative, experimental steps in
regulating germ-line therapy and to change their approach if it seems on reflection
to be wrong or if scientific changes suggest the need for policy changes.
Thus, if one focuses on process rather than substance, one comes to the conclu-
sion that there should be no legislation about germ-line therapy, other than to as-
sign authority to an administrative agency; that the agency should permit some de-
velopment of germ-line therapy, subject to careful restrictions; and that as the
scientific, social, and moral status of germ-line therapy becomes clearer, the
agency should reconsider its position regularly and often.
Process versus Substance
Focus on substance suggests to many people that germ-line therapy should be
prohibited, and may suggest to a few that it should be permitted without restriction.
Focus on process suggests that both of those positions should be rejected and that
minimal legal involvement should be used to allow the technology to develop
slowly while retaining the power to stop it if that becomes desirable. The question,
then, becomes how is one to choose between substantive values and process values
in deciding what to do about germ-line therapy?
This may be the place at which ethics and law diverge. An ethical analysis may
lead to a firm conclusion that one course of action is better than another. A person
who comes to such a conclusion is likely to believe that this "correct" position
should be adopted and imposed. Thus many ethicists have concluded that germ-
line therapy ought not to be permitted. 2
8
28 See, e.g., Marc Lapp6, "Ethical issues in Manipulating the Human Germ Line", 16 1.
Med. & Phil. 621, 638-39 (1991); C. Rehmann-Sutter "Gentherapie in der menschlichen
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A lawyer, on the other hand, is likely to be doubly skeptical. The lawyer will be
reluctant to believe that the ethical analysis has really reached the right answer;
indeed, the lawyer is likely to doubt the ability of human beings to ascertain right
answers to any questions worth asking. Thus, the lawyer will be reluctant to en-
shrine one viewpoint in the law. Second, the lawyer will be skeptical about the
ability of the law itself.29 Nobody understands the limitations of a set of institu-
tions and procedures as well as those who work with them every day.
Regardless of whether professional orientation predisposes to one course of ac-
tion or another, something must be said about the relative importance of substance
and process in the area of germ-line therapy. Substantive positions on the issue are,
as we have seen, rooted in ignorance and bald assertion of preferences. This makes
them a slender reed on which to rest public policy. Moreover, adopting a position
based on the substantive arguments will have catastrophic results if the decision
turns out to be wrong. Permitting unfettered development and application of germ-
line therapy may lead to injury to living persons and to generations yet unborn. It
may lead to dehumanization, to undesirable uses of genetic enhancement, and to
the exacerbation of social inequity. It may lead to serious damage to our collective
genetic essence. All of those consequences obviously should be avoided. On the
other hand, prohibiting germ-line therapy will almost surely deprive medicine of
an important tool in the fight against disease, squander an opportunity to eliminate
some serious diseases altogether, leave many patients with the Hobson's choice of
refraining from reproduction or deciding to propagate or risk propagating children
with serious genetic disorders, and cost society large sums of money to treat avoid-
able conditions. Those, too, are obviously consequences to eschew.
Following the dictates of process, on the other hand, minimizes the costs of mis-
takes. Adopting the administrative approach suggested above will provide some of
the benefits of germ-line therapy with only minimal risk and will permit receipt of
expanded benefits if the risks do not materialize. It will not commit society to one
course or another. It will act upon the recognition that the best course of action in
the face of ignorance is to temporize until the ignorance is overcome. Thus, in the
instance of germ-line therapy process values seem clearly to point toward a soun-
der direction for social action than substantive values do. This is one of the many
areas in which how one proceeds is the surest guide to what one ought to do.
Keimbahn?", Ethik in der Medizin 3, 3-12 (1991), cited in: Maurice A. M. de Wachter, Ethi-
cal Aspects of Human Germ-Line Therapy, 7 Bioethics 166, 175 (1993); Mauron/Thovo
supra fn. 9, at 659 (discussing the views of Hans Jonas).
29 See, e.g., the views of Cecil Clothier, Chair of the British Committee on Gene Therapy,
who called the law "a fairly blunt instrument," and stated, "As a lawyer, I would deprecate
any sort of legal control [on gene therapy] at this stage, because we do not know what we are




To the extent that various nations and international groups have dealt with germ-
line therapy to date, their record is mixed in terms of pursuing what I have sug-
gested is the best approach. A few examples will illustrate the point.
Germany has made it a crime to artificially alter "the genetic information of a
human germ line gene" or to use "a human germ line gene with artificially altered
genetic information". 30 This approach seems to be an overuse of the criminal sanc-
tion and to fail to take advantage of the benefits that greater attention to process
values could provide.
The United States has taken a somewhat more moderate position, but still one
that effectively precludes germ-line therapy. Gene therapy at institutions that re-
ceive any National Institutes of Health (NIH) support for recombinant DNA activ-
ities is governed by NIH guidelines. 31 In addition, the NIH and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) collaborate to control research directed at the production of
new drugs and other biological products.32 Gene therapy is regulated according to
Appendix M. of the guidelines, the so-called "Points to Consider".33 Under the
Guidelines gene therapy may not be performed unless the NIH's Recombinant
DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) has approved the protocol. The Points to Con-
sider state, "The RAC will not at present entertain proposals for germ-line altera-
tions but will consider for approval protocols involving somatic cell gene trans-
fer". 34 Thus, the current position in the United States is clear. No germ-line therapy
may be performed except by somebody at an institution that neither receives NIH
support for recombinant DNA activities, nor intends to seek approval for their ap-
proach from the FDA. Effectively, this means that germ-line therapy is not per-
mitted in the United States today.
In terms of the process oriented approach I have suggested, the American ap-
proach has some benefits. It remits decision making to an administrative agency
with considerable scientific, legal, and ethical expertise. The agency recognizes
the value of flexibility by stating plainly that its disapproval of germ-line therapy
is its position "at present", leaving open the possibility of changing its position
should conditions warrant.35 On the other hand, NIH's blanket rejection of germ-
line therapy squanders the RAC's opportunity to paint with a fine brush and exalts
30 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1, 2746, 2747, Embryonenschutzgesetz § 5 (trans. by Ralph
Gaebler).
31 Suprafn. 1, § I-C-1.
32 See, testimony of Dr Nelson Wivel, supra fn. 11, at 22-23.
33 Points to Consider in the Design and Submission of Protocols for the Transfer of Re-
combinant DNA Molecules into the Genome of One or More Human Subjects, Guidelines
for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines), Appendix M., 59
Fed. Reg. 34496, 34528-34 (1994).
34 Id, at 34529.
35 Bonnicksen,'supra fn. 25, at 43.
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the substantive values of those who oppose germ-line therapy over the values of
those who support it. Thus, the American position is more rigid than it needs to be,
and it impedes possibly useful scientific development more than is necessary to
achieve adequate protection from the feared evils of germ-line therapy.
Spain has two relevant statutes, one on the donation and use of human embryos
and fetuses, and one on assisted reproduction procedures. The former permits ge-
netic technology to be authorized,
For therapeutic purposes, principally for sex selection in the event of diseases linked to
the sex chromosomes, particularly chromosome X, thereby avoiding their transmission;
or to create beneficial genetic mosaics through surgery, by transplanting cells, tissues,
and organs from embryos and fetuses into patients in which these are biologically and
genetically modified or lacking; 36
The assisted reproduction procedures statute permits intervention on a human
pre-embryo only to treat the pre-embryo's disease or to prevent its transmission.
37
The statute then establishes conditions for engaging in therapeutics with pre-em-
bryos in vitro or on pre-embryos, embryos, or fetuses within the uterus. One condi-
tion is,
That there is no influence on non-pathological hereditary traits, and no selection of indi-
viduals or of race is sought;
38
If these provisions stood alone, they could be read as leaving open the door to
germ-line therapy. The first statute authorizes somatic cell therapy, but it is possi-
ble to interpret the language about creating beneficial genetic mosaics for patients
in whom their cells, tissues, or organs are "genetically modified or lacking" to per-
mit some germ-line therapy as well. Moreover, the emphasis in the assisted repro-
duction statute on preventing the transmission of disease, and the prohibition
against influencing non-pathological hereditary characteristics seems to imply that
efforts to influence pathological hereditary characteristics are permissible. This in-
terpretation would mean that germ-line therapy, but not enhancement, would be
permitted in Spain.
However, other statutory provisions make this interpretation unlikely.39 Article
14(3) of the assisted reproductive procedures law prohibits developing pre-em-
36 Act on the Donation and Use of Human Embryos and Fetuses or their Cells, Tissues, or
Organs, Stat. No. 42/1988 Art. 8 § 2c (Dec. 28, 1988) (Official Bulletin of the State, Dec. 31,
1988), International Digest of Health Legislation 66-67 (1991). This statute mirrors Council
of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1100 (1989) on the use of human em-
bryos and foetuses in scientific research, Appendix G, Application of scientific research to
the human being in the fields of health and heredity, 18.
37 Act on Assisted Reproduction Procedures, Stat. No. 35/1988 Art. 13 § 1 (Nov. 22,
1988) (Official Bulletin of the State, Nov. 24, 1988), International Digest of Health Legisla-
tion 82, 86 (1989).
38 Id, Art. 13 § 3d.
39 I am indebted to Professor Gonzalo Herranz of the Universidad de Navarra for the fol-
lowing understanding of Spanish law.
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bryos for procreation using gametes that have been used for experimentation. 4 0 Ar-
ticle 20(2)(B)(i) declares transferring gametes or pre-embryos to the uterus without
necessary biological or viability assurances to be a "very serious offense".4 1 As
there is no practical way to obtain the necessary assurances, this means that the
transfers cannot be made. Finally, the statute forecloses the use of human gene
therapy on embryos conceived through sexual intercourse by making it a "very
serious offense" to obtain "human pre-embryos by uterine lavage for any pur-
pose;" 42 and by prohibiting experimentation on pre-embryos in the uterus or fallo-
pian tubes.43 Thus, as a practical matter, Spanish law seems to be as restrictive as
German law and perhaps more restrictive than the American.
Israel deals with gene therapy through its control of research with human sub-
jects. Any new procedure designed to affect the health, "including the genetic
structure," of a person or fetus must be approved as a medical experiment on a hu-
man being.44 Any "experiment concerning the genetic structure of a person" can-
not be approved unless the administrator has received a written opinion from a
higher committee.45 This approach leaves open the question of whether the higher
committee will ever approve a germ-line experiment and appears to give the ad-
ministrative agency power to approve such an experiment if it thinks that doing so
would be wise.
At the inter-state level, the European Parliament has expressed its disapproval of
germ-line therapy.46 Nonetheless, the European Union has not yet adopted Union-
wide gene therapy regulation,47 and the Archer Report evaluating gene therapy,
which was prepared at the request of the Commission, took the position that the
great promise of germ-line therapy makes such therapy a "medical imperative". 48
The Council of Europe has had considerable difficulty in deciding on a position
regarding germ-line therapy. In 1982 the Parliamentary Assembly took the position
that the rights to life and human dignity "imply the right to inherit a genetic pat-
tern which has not been artificially changed". 49 Nonetheless, the Assembly recog-
nized the importance of not impeding the development of gene therapy50 and re-
40 Act on Assisted Reproduction Procedures, supra fl. 37, Art. 14 § 3.
41 Id, Art. 20 § 2 B i.
42 Id, Art. 20 § 2 B b.
43 Id, Art. 16 § 4.
44 The Laws of Israel, Chapter 12, Health, § 1.4 (1) (trans. by Derek Penslar).
41 Id, § 1.4(3)(b).
4 Parliament Resolution on Ethical and Legal Problems of Genetic Manipulations A2-
237/88 (1988), cited: in DeJager supra fn. 22, at 1315, n. 99.
47 DeJager supra ft. 22, at 1314.
48 Archer report, supra fn. 22 at 11, quoted in: DeJager, supra fn. 22, at 1333, n. 249.
49 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 934 (1982) on genetic
engineering 4i.
50 Id, 4.iii.
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commended that the Committee of Ministers recognize the right to a genetic in-
heritance that has not been interfered with "except in accordance with certain prin-
ciples which are recognized as being fully compatible with respect for human
rights (as, for example, in the field of therapeutic applications)".5 1 In 1986, the
Parliamentary Assembly interpreted its 1982 position as recognizing "the right to
a genetic inheritance which should not be artificially interfered with except for
therapeutic purposes". [emphasis added]52 Explicit recognition of an exception
for therapeutic purposes seemed to be a rejection of absolutism and to leave open
the door to germ-line therapy. However, in 1989 the Parliamentary Assembly sta-
ted clearly, "Any form of therapy on the human germinal line shall be forbid-
den".
53
Most recently, the Council of Europe has prepared a draft bioethics conven-
tion.54 That convention, if adopted, would authorize somatic cell gene therapy re-
lated to disease. It would, however, prohibit somatic cell enhancement therapy and
all germ-line therapy. 55 The drafters concluded that current scientific uncertainty
about the effects of germ-line therapy on future generations56 and concern about
imperilling the human species itself5 7 required them to ban germ-line therapy.
Thus, the present international situation with regard to genetic therapy is in flux.
Somatic cell therapy for the treatment of disease seems to be widely accepted,
although methods of regulating such therapy differ from country to country. Germ-
line therapy is usually rejected. However, no ethical consensus opposed to germ-
line therapy exists, and most countries have refrained from enacting a definitive
ban on such therapy. A consensus that rejects enhancement therapy does seem to
exist. A persuasive demonstration of the possibility of drawing a workable line be-
tween pathological and non-pathological conditions would probably go a long way
toward removing opposition to germ-line therapy by removing the fear of the slip-
pery slope to genetic enhancement.
51 Id, 7b.
52 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1046 (1986), Use of hu-
man embryos and foetuses for diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial
purposes 1 1.
53 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1100 18 (1989), supra
fn. 36.
54 Document 7124, Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of
the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Bioethics Con-
vention and Explanatory Memorandum, 6 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly,
Documents: Working Papers (1994).
55 Id, Art. 16 109-112.
56 Id, Art. 16 112.
57 Id, 1 10-11.
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Conclusion
People and nations respond to uncertainty in different ways. As we have seen,
the Council of Europe's response to scientific uncertainty about the risks of germ-
line therapy is to suggest banning the therapy.5 8 Germany has done so.59 This is
consistent with the view that a technology must be rejected if it presents even the
slightest possibility of a catastrophic consequence.60 Other prohibitionist views
can be traced to modesty about human abilities. Mauron and Th6voz have stated
that germ-line therapy means curing tomorrow's people with today's techniques
and conceptual tools. They argue that germ-line therapy should be rejected because
it may give excessive, lasting power to a contingent state of medical science.6
1
Similarly, Berger and Gert argue that unless we have almost certain knowledge
about the risks of germ-line therapy, no benefit to a small number of people can
outweigh the risk to many.
62
Conversely, some people respond to uncertainty by emphasizing the possibility
of benefits rather than harms. In its extreme form this view leads to the assertion
that not only is germ-line therapy ethically acceptable, but that medicine has a
moral obligation to pursue it.63
This article has argued that prudence dictates rejecting the arguments of both the
genetic optimists and the pessimists, and that sound policy lies in attempting to
reap the potential benefits of germ-line therapy while avoiding its dangers. It has
suggested that elevating the values of process over substance is the best way to
achieve this balanced middle view.
Attention to process suggests that administrative regulation, rooted in expertise
and committed to flexibility, is the most desirable way to respond to issues posed
by the consideration of germ-line therapy. Adopting this approach would lead to
reconsideration of the prohibition of germ-line therapy in countries like Germany
and Spain, to rejection of the prohibition of germ-line therapy in the Council of
Europe's proposed bioethics convention, 64 and to loosening of administrative pro-
hibitions of germ-line therapy in countries like the United States.
58 See fn. 56, supra, and accompanying text.
59 See fn. 30, supra, and accompanying text.
60 See fn. 24, supra, and accompanying text.
61 Mauron/Tlhvoz, supra fn. 9, at 661-62.
62 Berger/Gert, supra fn. 12, at 680.
63 Ronald Munson/Lawrence H. Davis, "Germ-Line Therapy and the Medical Impera-
tive", 2 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 137 (1992).
64 Indeed, attention to process may suggest the wisdom of avoiding all multinational ap-
proaches to the regulation of germ-line therapy, at least for the present Bonnicksen, supra fn.
25, at 46-47.
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Modesty about our ability to understand science is a desirable attitude. So too is
modesty about the ability of legal institutions to make positive contributions to the




Die Gentherapie verschafft der Gesellschaft m6glicherweise viele Vorteile. Zu-
gleich birgt sie m6glicherweise emste Gefahren. Die Sorge iber die m6glichen
Bedrohungen hat viele Menschen und Regierungen dazu bewogen, zumindest die
Keimbahntherapie zu verbieten oder ihr Verbot jedenfalls vorzuschlagen. Auf der
anderen Seite gibt es einige Leute, die die Ansicht vertreten, die Entwicklung der
Keimbahntherapie sei ein moralischer Imperativ.
Bei naherer Betrachtung zeigt sich, daB die Argumente fiir und wider die Keim-
bahntherapie auf Unwissenheit und bloBe, unbestlitigte Vermutungen zurickzuftih-
ren smnd. Politische Entscheidungen, die auf ihnen beruhen, sind sehr wahrschein-
lich verfehlt. Besser kann man mit den Problemen umgehen, die die Gentherapie
aufwirft, wenn man den Wert rechtlich geregelter Verfahren in Rechnung stellt.
Die Untersuchung der StArken und Schwlichen verschiedener rechtlicher Institutio-
nen fiihrt zu dem SchluB, daB flexible Verwaltungsregeln das beste Mittel darstel-
len, die Chancen fUr eine Nutzung der Gentherapie zu maximieren und zugleich
ihre Risiken zu minimieren.
Soweit nationale Regierungen und internationale KOrperschaften sich mit Fra-
gen der Gentherapie befaft haben, haben sie im allgemeinen nur unzureichend auf
Verfahrenswerte geachtet und auf Bedenken gegentiber der Keimbahntherapie mit
einem Verbot derselben iiberreagiert.
65 "Those entering this debate should recognize that their work is primarily in the realm
of ideology, a treacherous territory. It is surely a realm where the full force of law should be
left out, because of the lingering uncertainties, and where those engaged in the debate should
proceed with due humility." Cook-Deegan, supra fn. 27, at 219.
5 Jalhrbuch ffir Recht und Ethik, Bd. 4 (1996)

